June 8, 2010

Figuring Out Your Way to Startup Success

“Team.”  It’s the cliché response from VCs when asked about the most important factor in deciding to fund a new startup.

But what separates great teams from weak teams? I believe it’s the team’s ability to “figure stuff out.” Founders figure out potential customer problems that are worth solving.  Engineers figure out how to build a well functioning product that meets this need.  Marketers figure out how to reach people who really need the product and how to convert them into customers…

While natural talent is a big part of figuring stuff out, we can all benefit by improving our work environment.  There are two areas in particular that prevent creative problem solving.

1) Too much focus on financial rewards

It is obvious that the effort required to raise VC funds can be a major distraction from executing the business, but few realize that the repetitive discussions about financial outcomes can also shut down your ability to figure stuff out. In my 15 years in startups, I can’t think of a single breakthrough epiphany we experienced while fundraising.

Daniel Pink demonstrates the potentially negative effect of financial incentives in his new book Drive, The Surprising Truth About What Motivates Us.  He describes several experiments where people who were offered a financial reward to quickly complete a challenging task actually performed worse than those who simply did it for enjoyment.  An important part of figuring things out is getting into a state of flow (sometimes known as being in “the zone”) and a focus on financial incentives often prevents this state of mind.

The book mostly challenges the effectiveness of typical incentive structures inside more established businesses, but I believe the implications are even stronger in startups where survival is contingent on our ability to figure stuff out and the financial rewards of doing so are potentially enormous.

2) Too much pressure

I’ve also realized that I’m not good at figuring stuff out when I put too much pressure on myself.  A few months ago I had a beer with a friend and successful serial entrepreneur, Antony Brydon, and he zoomed right in on my problem.  I had put myself under so much pressure to help the startup with which I was working, that I had virtually shut down my creative abilities.  He mentioned that he’d been reading Andre Agassi’s autobiography where similar self-induced pressure had destroyed Andre’s ability to play tennis.  His career only recovered when he remembered to loosen up and have fun.   Every time I feel myself getting tense, I now remind myself to loosen up and immediately feel my creative problem solving abilities return.

While self-induced pressure is common in startups, pressure can also be applied externally by the Board (or the CEO to the rest of the team).  Most leaders don’t realize how counterproductive this can be in a startup.  It is OK to apply pressure for better execution of things that have been figured out, but it should be applied very sparingly when trying to encourage the team to figure out the remaining unknowns.

The solution: loosen up and have fun

When breakthrough thinking is needed, a fun, collaborative and supportive environment will generally yield better/faster results than the pressure of sticks and carrots.  This is especially important in the early days of a startup while the team is still figuring out a viable formula for the business.

Also, given the likely negative effects of fundraising, I recommend fewer/bigger rounds of financing (if possible).  Run leanly on your first round while you figure out the key success elements of the startup.  Then raise another round while executing the formula.  This may result in more dilution, but a more valuable company should offset this dilution.

Finally, encourage the team to obsess about solving customer problems rather than their potential financial outcome from success.  The best breakthroughs initially come from immersion in customer problems and then later from understanding the customer experience and benefits of your solution.

May 17, 2010

Key Elements of a Massively Scalable Startup

VC backed startups generally aspire to valuations in the hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars, but very few really consider all of the elements they’ll need to make it happen.  After analyzing several startups I’ve worked with that have reached or are approaching these valuations I’ve boiled it down to four interdependent commonalities that always seem to exist.  While they are easy to describe, they are of course very difficult to achieve.  Still your best chance of achieving them is to know what they are.

Element 1: Gratification engine

 

Your gratification engine is the repeatable process of turning cold prospects into highly gratified customers. Whether you are aiming big or small, an effective gratification engine is probably the hardest of the four elements for a startup to get right.   Tenacious execution works for a lot of things, but you can’t force customers to want, need or like what you have created.  Building an effective gratification engine is an iterative process driven by a lot of prospective customer feedback.  Once you get the basics right, your process of gratifying users can be optimized with tools like Performable for landing pages and KISSmetrics for full funnel tracking/improvement (I’m an advisor to both).

Element 2: Economic engine

Once you have figured out how to gratify prospects, your next challenge is creating a viable economic engine.  For your business to be sustainable in the long run your average revenue per user will need to exceed your average cost per user.  Beyond business sustainability, the right monetization approach will also be based on the value users get from your solution, the competitive environment and your ultimate growth strategy.

Element 3: Growth engine

Your growth engine is very dependent on your economic engine.  If you have relatively limited revenue per user, you’ll need to pursue tactics with a very low marginal cost such as PR, SEO or viral marketing.  With a higher revenue per user, you’ll also be able to effectively arbitrage growth through paid tactics like display advertising and SEM.  The most valuable companies generally choose an approach that allows them to capture the biggest share of the market in a sustainable way.  This often means a strategy with lower revenue per user.  They don’t invest too much time in one off gimmicks, instead they focus on growth drivers that can be repeatable and scalable.

Element 4: Huge addressable market

The best opportunities generally have the hardest markets to accurately size.  That’s because these are fast growing or whole new markets that are based on potential rather than existing customers.  Perfect accuracy on market sizing isn’t important here.  Instead creative scenarios that show how it will likely be big should generally suffice.  You also want to breakdown potential segments and people that are new to the market or coming from an existing related market.  Again, you just want to have approximations that are believable and big.

Start with a Hypothesis for Each Element

It is important to have a realistic hypothesis for each of these elements before you even get started with the business.  If you are having a hard time creating a realistic hypothesis for one or more of these elements, your vision probably isn’t viable.

I can often look at a business for less than an hour and decide if I believe it is massively scalable opportunity based on my hypothesis for each of these.  If I’m not confident on a specific element, I spend a lot of time vetting this with the CEO before committing to a project

Of course it won’t happen exactly the way you plan.  The best opportunities have multiple contingency plans in case your initial theory doesn’t work.  But if you can’t even creatively come up with a viable theory for each, you’ll likely have a very hard time raising VC funds.  Once you have a theory for each, start with the practical bottoms up execution described in the startup pyramid post.

April 27, 2010

Dropbox – The Power of a “Value Based” Startup

Drew Houston, CEO/Founder of Dropbox, gave an amazingly forthcoming presentation at the Startup Lessons Learned Conference chronicling his team’s path from idea to their current position as one of today’s hottest startups.

Because of the importance of protecting user data, they modified the “launch early, launch often” mantra to “learn early, learn often.”  And they aspired to gain the “best understanding of customers as early as possible.”

My favorite quote from Drew’s presentation highlighted the power of focusing on what is really important: “If you make a feature matrix of Dropbox versus all the other products out there, we’ll never come out in front.  We wanted to do a few things [really] well as opposed to a lot of things kind of well, presented in a way that’s confusing.”

Dropbox struggled to find effective paid marketing channels, but Drew states: “The one thing that saved us was that we put all of our effort into something that worked, that was an elegant solution.”  They then empowered extremely gratified users to spread the word about Dropbox.

The result: In 15 months, Dropbox attracted 4 million users.  In the last 30 days users have sent 2.8 million direct referral invites.  Watch the video, you’ll definitely learn something.  During my time with Dropbox, I learned how to build a sustainable startup (and business in general) the right way.


Watch live video from Startup Lessons Learned on Justin.tv

April 26, 2010

Steve Blank’s SLL Keynote – It’s a “Must Watch”


Watch live video from Startup Lessons Learned on Justin.tv

Some of my favorite quote are:

Role of the Entrepreneur

  • Your job as an entrepreneur in a startup is to search for a repeatable and scalable business model. When you find it, your job is to build a company around that business model.
  • Search for a business model rather than write a business plan. Biz model is how a company makes money.
  • Customer and agile development is how you search for a business model.
  • You fail if you stay a startup – goal is to become a large company.  Search is bringing order out of chaos, pivoting all the time.
  • Goal is not to becoming the world’s most fun startup. Goal is to become a valuable company.
  • No business plan survives first contact with the customer.

Differences Between Startups and Established Companies

  • Startups search and pivot; companies execute.
  • Very different skills needed to execute a business model compared to those needed to search for a business model.
  • Customer development = hypothesis testing, minimum feature sets and pivoting.  Product management is very different than customer development.
  • You need to brainwash and deprogram product managers if you want them to perform customer development.
  • Key startup numbers are not: balance sheet, income statements and cashflow.  They are cash, viral coefficient, customer acquisition cost, burn rate, average transaction size…

Want more Steve?  Check out his blog.

April 25, 2010

Early Detection is Key

Following the Startup Lessons Learned conference, I had the Founder/CEO of a startup tell me that she finally ran the Survey.io customer development survey. She was thrilled to discover that more than 40% of her users considered her product to be a “must have.” She had avoided running the survey earlier for fear of a disappointing number. But now that she has run it, she can confidently start planning the steps needed to scale her business (see Startup Pyramid post).

Her fear is common among many startup founders. We have so much invested in the vision (especially emotionally), that we dread an inconvenient truth standing in the way of our dream.

The fear reminds me of one of my personal life missions. Over the last five years I’ve strongly encouraged my friends to get physical exams – especially entrepreneurs consumed by their startups. I know how hard it is to make time.  At perhaps the most intense period of scaling LogMeIn I was putting off a routine physical exam. I felt healthy, so why worry? But I gave up half of a day anyway and finally got a complete checkup. It turned out that I had the very early stages of bladder cancer. A simple procedure removed the cancer and I haven’t had any signs since. But if I had waited just a few more months, my doctor explained that the prognosis would have been a lot scarier. If you haven’t had a physical exam recently, please make the time. It could save your life.

And on a much lighter note, if you haven’t run the customer development survey on Survey.io, just do it (it’s free). If too few people consider your product a “must have”, you’ll want to pivot/course correct as early as possible.

April 20, 2010

A Lean Start is Smart

Lean Vs Fat Startups
When I read Ben Horowitz’s article “The Case For The Fat Startup” http://bhorowitz.com/2010/03/17/the-case-for-the-fat-startup/ I expected to be in violent disagreement with most of it.  However, I was surprised to find myself mostly nodding in agreement.  Many of the moves he describes that led to the survival and success of Opsware/Loudcloud were similar to the ones I advocated as an executive in a post dotcom bubble public company (Uproar.com).  Cutting was important, but it was even more important to protect and build on the value that we had created.
So how can I find myself agreeing with Horowitz, when he seems to be such a vocal critic of Lean Startups?
Well first, he’s not against running leanly.   He simply suggests that lean shouldn’t be the end goal.  Instead, he claims startups should be focused on survival and market leadership – both of which benefit from more money.  However, his examples mostly center on companies that have significant traction.  Take Facebook, which he touts as a “fat startup” because they have raised over $700m.  The fact is that they didn’t start out fat; in their first year they only raised $500,000.
This mirrors my experience at multiple successful startups.   Most maintained a very low burn in the first year, investing funds carefully to create a valuable product.  Only after early users validated that it was a must-have product, did we start loosening the purse strings.  Speed of execution to fully capture the opportunity became the primary objective.  At this point, most of the companies were able to successfully attract additional financing (often very large rounds).
Perhaps the most important realization that I’ve made as a result of this debate is that: Lean Startup principles are most critical in the early stages of a startup before product/market fit.  If you have not created a “must-have product” your ability to attract future rounds of financing will be limited if not impossible.  Your best chance of survival is to create a must-have product on your first round of financing – with the overwhelming majority of funding going into R&D.  Once you have created a must-have product, it will be much easier to raise enough money to capture and lead the market.
Of course, this could be an argument for a big first round of financing.  I rarely advocate raising a small round if you can raise a big one.  But it’s important to recognize that the best VCs invest small before traction and big after traction.  They realize that overinvesting up front rarely improves a startup’s ability to create a must-have product.  If you are fortunate enough to raise a substantial round up front, you’ll need discipline not to spend in areas that aren’t essential to creating a must-have product.  If you have the right discipline, your only important risk of raising a big early round is limiting the potential for lucrative small early exits.  But more likely you won’t be able to raise a substantial round until you have created a must-have product.  Once you can prove an ability to scale cost-effective growth for this must-have product, smart VCs will be knocking down your door to invest as much as you can realistically absorb – and often more.

When I read Ben Horowitz’s article “The Case For The Fat Startup” I expected to be in violent disagreement with most of it.  So I was surprised to find myself mostly nodding in agreement.  Many of the moves he describes that led to the survival and success of Opsware/Loudcloud were similar to the ones I advocated as an executive in a post dotcom bubble public company (Uproar.com).  Cutting was important, but it was even more important to protect and build on the value that we had created.

So how can I find myself agreeing with Horowitz, when he seems to be such a vocal critic of Lean Startups?

Well first, he’s not against running leanly.   He simply suggests that lean shouldn’t be the end goal.  Instead, he recommends startups should be focused on survival and market leadership – both of which benefit from more money.  However, his examples mostly center on companies that have significant traction.  Take Facebook, which he touts as a “fat startup” because they have raised over $700m.  The fact is that they didn’t start out fat; in their first year they only raised $500,000.

This mirrors my experience at multiple successful startups.   Most maintained a very low burn in the first year, investing funds carefully to create a valuable product.  Only after early users validated that it was a must-have product, did we start loosening the purse strings.  Speed of execution to fully capture the opportunity became the primary objective.  At this point, most of the companies were able to successfully attract additional financing (often very large rounds).

Perhaps the most important realization that I’ve made as a result of this debate is that: Lean Startup principles are most critical in the early stages of a startup before product/market fit.  If you have not created a “must-have product” your ability to attract future rounds of financing will be limited if not impossible.  Your best chance of survival is to create a must-have product on your first round of financing – with the overwhelming majority of funding going into R&D.  Once you have created a must-have product, it will be much easier to raise enough money to capture and lead the market.

Of course, this could be an argument for a big first round of financing.  I rarely advocate raising a small round if you can raise a big one.  But it’s important to recognize that the best VCs invest small before traction and big after traction.  They realize that overinvesting up front rarely improves a startup’s ability to create a must-have product.  If you are fortunate enough to raise a substantial round up front, you’ll need discipline not to spend in areas that aren’t essential to creating a must-have product.  If you have the right discipline, your only important risk of raising a big early round is limiting the potential for lucrative small early exits.  But more likely you won’t be able to raise a substantial round until you have created a must-have product.  Once you can prove an ability to scale cost-effective growth for this must-have product, smart VCs will be knocking down your door to invest as much as you can realistically absorb – and often more.

Note: Eric Ries clears up some of the common mis-perceptions about lean startups in this post.

March 1, 2010

Optimization Mistakes that Kill Startups

I once believed optimization was the secret weapon that could make almost any startup successful. It was certainly a critical part of reaching millions of users in each of my first five startup marketing roles. At a couple of startups we saw a tripling of conversion rates from a single experiment. When we tripled conversion rates, we tripled the effectiveness of every future marketing dollar.

I first became a fan of funnel optimization at one of my early startups where we had hit a wall trying to develop scalable customer acquisition channels.  We decided to temporarily stop trying to find new customer acquisition channels and focus instead on improving conversion rates.  A few months later we resumed channel building and were able to scale the same previously tested channels to support 100X the marketing spend with the same target ROI per dollar spent.  Beyond the clear benefit of enabling scalable marketing campaigns, the improved user experience also resulted in a multifold increase in free organic growth.  User growth immediately hockey-sticked and years later still  hasn’t diminished.  All the while, the company maintained cashflow positive results.

These benefits probably have you chomping at the bit to start your own optimization program. But be careful, optimization can easily kill a startup when not done right (or at the right time).

Here are the three most common optimization mistakes startups make:

1) Premature optimization – Optimization is about improving the path that users take to reach a certain destination within your website. For most sites it’s ultimately about getting people to experience and buy your product. While this seems like an important goal from the beginning, it’s not. If the value of your core product is weak, doubling the percentage of users that get there won’t help much. And it will actually hurt you because every unit of effort put into optimization is one less unit that you can put into improving your core product. Products that don’t become a “must have” almost always fail.

My recommendation for startups is not to begin optimizing until at least 40% of your randomly surveyed users say they would be “very disappointed” without your product. That doesn’t mean you shouldn’t try to have a great first user experience, rather it means you shouldn’t start iterating flows until the core product meets this threshold.  The only exception to this is if your value proposition will increase because of a network effect (like eBay). I’ll try to write a post on this scenario soon.

2) Not being deliberate –To execute full funnel optimization you test multiple changes at every step in the acquisition process. Since every change is also an opportunity to screw things up it’s extremely important to measure the actual results of a change. Unfortunately traditional analytics programs aren’t helpful here since they don’t track specific user cohorts moving through the funnel (AKA groups of users). In the early startups I worked with we spent months building systems internally to track conversions at the user level. Fortunately “off the shelf” systems are now cropping up that make user level funnel tracking much easier (I’ve been advising KISSmetrics on such a system for over a year and I’m now using it in a couple projects). With the right system you can track your “measures of success” and roll back any changes that havea negative effect on these metrics.

This presents a new problem. Anyone with a basic understanding of statistics will realize that optimization is a numbers game. If you test enough things you will definitely find something that improves your key measures. That’s the theory, but the reality is that you’ll never get past the first few tests if the early ones don’t yield improvements. People quickly lose faith in the process. Therefore it is essential to vet every test idea before asking the development team implement it. Prioritize test ideas so that the easiest and/or most likely to improve results are implemented first.

3) Killing the love – One thing that is rarely measured in an optimization project is a reduction in the core value perceived by your most passionate users. Your ability to deliver an experience that creates passionate users is your most important asset as a business and must be protected. It can be improved, but it must be done very carefully. The first step in protecting it is to understand it. I never attempt an optimization project without first doing a project that helps me understand the use cases of the most passionate users. After this initial project, which I combine with messaging optimization, I am in a much better position to safely optimize the full conversion funnel.

Effective optimization requires the right tools, qualitative research/understanding and a systematic approach to testing. When executed properly it can easily result in 2X – 10X improvements in conversion rates. No business will come close to its potential without a concerted optimization effort, but be careful to avoid the mistakes listed above.

For more context on where optimization fits into the overall startup marketing priorities, see this post on The Startup Pyramid.

January 14, 2010

Bringing Your Product to Market

I’ve just completed a hectic week of marketing workshops with startups in the UK and Ireland.  There were insightful contributions from most of the attendees – the collective marketing discoveries of startups that conduct metrics driven experiments is amazing.

In Ireland we went deep in an all day session that included war stories from the founders and marketers that grew two very successful Irish companies – Hostelworld.com and Paddy Power.   Hostelworld.com offers useful insights into an effective way to bring a “network effects” startup to market.  I’ll try to get permission from the team to write a case study.  Both companies provided additional validation to the recommendations in this post – http://startup-marketing.com/the-startup-pyramid/.

In other news, part 2 of my Venture Hacks interview is now live (bringing your product to market) – http://venturehacks.com/articles/sean-ellis-interview-2 .  Nivi and I discuss what to do after getting to product/market fit.  I’ve blogged about most of this stuff before, but there are a few additional details that Nivi was able to extract through his insightful questions.